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SECURITY INTERESTS IN INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND UN-
EARNED PREMIUMS-HAVE THE COURTS GONE TOO FAR
WITH TRUTH IN LENDING?
The Truth in Lending Act' is the popular name for Subchapter
One of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.2 Passage of the
Act in 1968 was the result of several years of congressional study
and debate concerning mandatory disclosure requirements in con-
sumer credit transactions. Congress, cognizant that consumers were
remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations and the
costs of deferring payment, was faced with consumer credit expan-
sion at an extremely rapid rate. Credit was experiencing a growth
rate more than four and one-half times as great as that of the
economy as a whole, increasing from $5.6 billion shortly after World
War II to $95.9 billion in 1967.'
Prior to the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act, consumers
were unable to make simple and direct cost comparisons among the
many alternative sources of credit, such as bank financing, credit
loans, or revolving credit. In most circumstances, consumers were
faced with divergent methods of credit cost disclosure and, at times,
fraudulent creditor practices. Many consumers were prevented from
shopping for the best credit terms available and often were prompted
to assume liabilities they could not afford.'
1. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 102, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-665 (1976).
2. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act is a multipronged statutory
scheme enacted by Congress to protect consumers. Included in the scheme are the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-665 (1976), compelling creditors to disclose the
true cost of credit; the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976), setting forth
procedures to protect debtors when a billing dispute arises; the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), regulating credit reporting agencies; the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976); and the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1667-1667e (1977).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1966.
4. Proponents of the legislation claimed that the Act would enhance the con-
sumer's ability to make an informed choice even if finance charges were hidden. For
example, the Act requires disclosure of the actual cash selling price and any finance
charges. Thus, the judgment of the consumer can be on the basis of both these factors,
not merely one alone. If a merchant attempts to have a low finance charge and bury it
in a high cash price, then the consumer is able to use comparative shopping on price
just as much as on the finance charges. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong.,
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Truth in Lending was designed to remedy the problem.' The
primary purpose of the Act is to require creditors to provide con-
sumers with meaningful and uniform disclosures of credit costs and
terms.' Under the Truth in Lending Act, Congress delegated
authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
to construct regulations to implement and carry out the legislative
purpose of the statute. The Board of Governor's regulations, known
as Regulation Z,' are comprehensive and contain a full restatement
of all the requirements of the Act.
Supporters of the Act originally envisioned a simple statutory
scheme, allowing the consumer to make credit decisions on the basis
of comparing meaningfully disclosed costs of credit.' However, there
is rising concern, even among the sponsors of the Act,' that it is not
1st Sess. 13, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1966; S. REP. No.
392, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962,
1966.
5. The House Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
[Bly requiring all creditors to disclose credit information in a uniform manner, and
by requiring all additional mandatory charges imposed by the creditor as an inci-
dent to credit be included in the computation of the applicable percentage rate,
the American consumer will be given the information he needs to compare the
costs of credit and to make the best informed decision on the use of credit.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 n.4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1962, 1970.
6. The Act provides: "[I]t is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
7. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-226.13 (1980).
8. For example, in his Consumer Message of 1967, President Lyndon Johnson
stated: "I recommend the Truth in Lending Act of 1967 to assure ... full and accurate
information to the borrower, and simple and routine calculation for the lender. The
Truth in Lending Act of 1967 would strengthen the efficiency of our credit markets
without restraining them." S. JOURNAL, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 158, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962 (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, Senator
William Proxmire, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, and one of
the principal advocates of Truth in Lending, commenced hearings on the proposed act
by stating:
I want to emphasize the essential purpose of this bill. We are considering a
full disclosure bill and nothing more. The bill does not regulate credit. The bill
does not tell lenders how much they can charge. The bill contains no assumption
that credit is bad. The bill contains no implications that the vast majority of
creditors are nothing [sic] but the most honest and productive businessmen who
are making a valuable contribution to our dynamic economy. In short, the bill con-
tains no indictment of the credit industry.
Proposed Consumer Credit Protection Act, Hearings on S.5 Before the Subcomm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (statement of William Proxmire).
9. In recent years, Senator Proxmire and others have supported major proposals
aimed at simplification of Truth in Lending. See text at notes 78-83, infra.
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accomplishing its goals." Nevertheless, because of the numerous
hardships, financial and otherwise, incurred by consumers that tend
to discourage consumer litigation, the Truth in Lending Act pro-
vides several incentives for consumer suits." For example, the con-
sumer is given access to federal court without regard to jurisdic-
tional amount12 and is awarded reasonable attorney's fees if suc-
cessful, with the amount of fees not contingent upon the amount of
the plaintiff's recovery." The Act allows recovery for actual
damages or for twice the finance charge," with a maximum recovery
of $1,000 and a minimum of $100.15
Since the general standard under the Truth in Lending Act is
clear and meaningful disclosure, the debtor who brings an action
alleging a violation benefits from a jurisprudential requirement of
strict compliance with the technical terms of the Act. All am-
biguities in the disclosure statement are construed against the
creditor, since it is both the drafter of the disclosures and the party
upon whom the Act imposes the burden of compliance." Further,
Regulation Z adds requirements that are not mandated by the Act
itself: components of the finance charge must be separately item-
ized; 7  prepaid finance charges must be disclosed;" and all
disclosures must be made on a single document, either above the
consumer's signature on the note evidencing the obligation, or on
"tone side of a separate statement which identifies the transaction.''19
10. Many authorities believe that Regulation Z has expanded the quantity and the
detail of the disclosure requirements to the point that unnecessarily complex dis-
closures that consumers may ignore or fail to understand are destroying the benefits
of the Act. See text at notes 78-83, infra.
11. Further, there are a number of jurisprudential developments which provide
strong economic incentives for the creditor to comply.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). It is not uncommon for attorney's fees of several
thousands of dollars to be awarded to a plaintiff even though the maximum damage
recovery is $1,000. See, e.g., Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 817 (7th
Cir. 1976) (amount loaned was $300 while the total award which the creditor was re-
quired to pay because of attorney's fees and costs was over $3,000).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1976).
15. In class actions actual damages can be recovered, but the ceiling on any award
is limited to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of a creditor's net worth.
16. See Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(8)(i), (d)(3) (1980).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(6), (d)(2) (1980).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1980). See Lauletta v. Valley Buick, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
1036, 1040 (W.D. Pa. 1976), wherein the court stated: "Regulation Z unequivocally re-
quires that necessary disclosures shall be written and made together on one document.
The drafters of the legislation obviously felt that oral statements by creditors or
piecemeal disclosures are not adequate to ensure the consumer's protection."
1980]
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It is readily apparent that these incentives to litigate for con-
sumers often result in disincentives to litigate for creditors.
Creditors may find it more advantageous to settle a weak claim than
to incur the costs of a defense that could far exceed the amount of
statutory damages. 5 Moreover, estimates indicate that consumers
are likely to win a majority of the cases that are decided on the
merits. 21 Because of a vague standard of accountability generated by
inconsistent interpretations of Truth in Lending and Regulation Z,
creditors often seek to insulate themselves from suits with lengthy
disclosure statements jammed with every bit of information they
think a court might require.2 Frequently, the inability to anticipate
judicial construction of violations renders the creditor's efforts
futile. The result is a frustration of the purpose of the Truth in
Lending Act, as the consumer is left with a complex disclosure
statement which he often ignores or fails to understand.
Security Interests Violations
To ensure clear and meaningful disclosures, the Truth in Lend-
ing Act and Regulation Z delineate specifically what must be disclosed.
The specific disclosure requirements for security interests are set
out in 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10)23 and Regulation Z § 226.8(b)(5). 24
Although the Truth in Lending Act does not define "security inter-
est," it is defined in section 226.2(gg) of Regulation Z as an interest
in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
20. See note 13, supra.
21. See generally Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 ILL. L.
FORUM 669, 681.
22. Creditors often protest that they are being harassed by increasingly technical
claims based on minor and harmless violations of the Act. See Hearings on S.3008
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55170 (1976).
23. Actually, the Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure of security interests
for closed-end credit transactions for both sales and consumer loans under 15 U.S.C. §
1638(a)(10) (1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8) (1976), respectively. Under these provisions,
the extender of credit is required to include on the disclosure statement a description
of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connec-
tion with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the
security interest relates.
24. Section 226.8(b) provides in pertinent part:
In any transaction subject this section, the following items, as applicable, shall be
disclosed: ...
(5) A description or identification of the type of any security interest held or
to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of
credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security in-
terest relates or, if such property is not identifiable, an explanation of the
manner in which the creditor retains or may acquire a security interest in
such property ....
12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1980).
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The term includes, but is not limited to, security interests under the
Uniform Commercial Code, vendor's liens, and liens on property
arising by operation of law.
One Federal Reserve Board staff letter interpreting Regulation
Z stated that "the primary purpose of § 226.8(b)(5), requiring
disclosure of a security interest, is to alert the customer at the
outset of the transaction that his property might be used to
discharge the debt which he had incurred, should it become
necessary." 5 In general, disclosure is required of (1) the type of
security interest retained or acquired by the creditor and (2) a clear
identification of the specific property subject to the security in-
terest. Among the types of security interests required to be disclosed
are chattel mortgages," interests in after-acquired property, 27 and
add-on credit sales. Moreover, a creditor's interest may require
disclosure even though that interest is not perfected under ap-
plicable state law.'
Alleged security interest disclosure violations have prompted a
disproportionate amount of litigation in Truth in Lending. Because
the courts have been inconsistent in identifying security interests,
creditors are left with little guidance in predicting whether a par-
ticular right should be disclosed. In some instances seemingly ob-
vious rights requiring section 226.8(b)(5) disclosure have been held
not to be security interests. For example, a creditor's right to set
off a consumer's deposits against his indebtedness was determined
not to be a security interest in the property of depositors, and
disclosure was not required." In other situations, somewhat more
25. Staff Opinion Letter No. 1145, CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,520 (Jan. 11,
1977). Interpretation letters of Regulation Z are published by the Federal Reserve
Board in response to inquiries from interested persons. The letters are not binding on
the courts, but rather are intended as an unofficial means of helping creditors to comply
with the technicalities of the regulation. The Federal Reserve Board also publishes of-
ficial staff interpretations pursuant to Regulation Z section 226.1(d); good faith reliance
upon these official interpretations constitutes a defense to liability.
26. Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. La.) aff'd, 500 F.2d 1182
(5th Cir. 1974).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1980). See generally Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin.
Co., 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Staff Opinion Letter No. 829, CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH), 1 31,151 (Aug. 22, 1974).
28. Blackmond v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 428 F. Supp. 344 (D.C. D.C. 1977).
29. Staff Opinion Letter No. 1145, note 25, supra. The staff determined that if
mere retention of the certificate of title of an automobile gives a creditor the right to
note its interest on the title under applicable state law, a security interest is created,
notwithstanding the creditor's failure to secure a chattel mortgage on the automobile.
30. Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974). The court stated:
Plainly a banker's privilege to apply the debt arising from a deposit against a
19801
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obscure rights of creditors, such as a waiver of homestead exemp-
tion, 1 have been determined to be valid security interests. More-
over, with certain interests, such as the right of acceleration, the
circuits have been unable to agree whether disclosure is required.2
Compounding the problems involved in deciding which interests re-
quire disclosure are cases which hold that disclosures by creditors of
non-existent security interests violate section 226.6(c) of Regulation
Z prohibiting false or misleading disclosures.
One particularly troublesome interest has been the right of
creditors in the proceeds and unearned premiums of property in-
surance policies covering the collateral for a loan. For example,
when a borrower finances an automobile and secures the loan with a
chattel mortgage on the vehicle, the standard practice of the lending
industry is to require the borrower to name the creditor as the loss
payee in the borrower's automobile insurance policy. By assignment,
the creditor is usually given the unequivocal power to receive and
apply any insurance proceeds or unearned premiums to the unpaid
balance of the loan. The creation of this right is so common that it
may be viewed as incidental to virtually all consumer loans secured
by insurable property, regardless of the type of property purchased
or of the ability of the borrower to pay.3 Yet, very few creditors
would view a loss payable clause as creating a security interest in
property similar to a mortgage or lien. Nevertheless, with some dis-
senting opinion, the jurisprudence appears to be settled that the
assignment of insurance proceeds and unearned premiums creates
security interests that require disclosure.
The first case to address this issue was Gennuso v. Commercial
Bank and Trust Company.5 Extending credit to the borrower for
depositor's unrelated debt to the bank is not a security interest in the ordinary
sense. A deposit of money to one's credit in a bank, although it may give rise to a
set off allowing the bank to obtain more than other general creditors, "is not a
transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift or security."
496 F.2d at 934 (citations omitted).
31. See Elzea v. National Bank of Georgia, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978). See also
Lamar v. American Finance Systems, 577 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1978) (categorized security
interests to include the foregoing of any valuable right).
32. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits consistently have held that the right of accelera-
tion is not a security interest requiring disclosure. See Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977). Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976).
Other circuits have required disclosure of the right of acceleration in at least some cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
33. Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust, 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977); Engle v.
Shapert Constr. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
34. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.
1978).
35. 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977).
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the purchase of a new automobile, the lender was assigned an in-
terest in the proceeds and in the unearned premiums of a property
insurance policy covering the automobile. Although the only security
interest disclosed on the lender's disclosure statement was that of
the automobile used as collateral, the reader was referred to a
separate "Note and Security Agreement" in which the loss payee in-
terest in the insurance policy was fully described." The borrower
claimed a violation of the Act's disclosure provisions, and the Third
Circuit agreed, holding that a security interest had been created in
the insurance proceeds and unearned premiums and that the lender
had violated Regulation Z by failing to make all necessary
disclosures on one side of a single document. 7
While the court in Gennuso devotes much language to the
previously established "one document" rule, there is little discus-
sion of the court's determination that a security interest is created
under Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(5) when a creditor is assigned
rights to the proceeds and unearned premiums of property in-
surance. 9 Unfortunately, the court offers no guidance as to why
such assignments create security interests within the contemplation
of Regulation Z. While convinced that the borrower was apprised of
the creditor's rights and that the facts "admittedly [did] not involve
egregious misconduct on the part of [the bank]," the court never-
theless felt constrained to hold the creditor liable for violation of the
security interest disclosure requirements of Regulation Z.'0
Although Gennuso did not address directly the reasons for find-
ing a security interest, the court in Edmondson v. Allen-Russell
Ford, Inc." did. Confronted with a factual situation analogous to that
in Gennuso, the Edmondson court similarly found that the assign-
ment of returned or unearned premiums of a property insurance
policy"2 was a security interest under section 226.8(b)(5). In so
36. See note 19, supra, for the requirement that all disclosures be made on the
same side of a single document.
37. 566 F.2d at 440.
38. See note 19, supra.
39. In one sentence, the Gennuso court stated that the debtor's covenants "create
a security interest in an insurance policy covering the automobile." 566 F.2d at 440.
The balance of the opinion treating the issue is devoted to the previously established
requirement that every security interest be identified clearly under the "one docu-
ment" rule. See note 19 supra.
40. Id. at 443.
41. 577 F.2d 291, 291 (5th Cir. 1978). The same day, the Fifth Circuit also decided
Shanks v. Greenbriar Dodge, 577 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1978), involving similar cir-
cumstances and an identical holding.
42. This right gives the creditor the discretion, in the event of the borrower's
default, to cancel the insurance policy and to apply any premium refund to the unpaid
19801
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
holding, the court gave the term "security interest" an extremely
broad reading; the court was convinced that the assignment con-
ferred an interest in property designed to secure payment or per-
formance of contractual obligations.'" The right to unearned property
insurance premiums was viewed to be a valuable economic right
that the debtor had surrendered in favor of the creditor to the ex-
tent of the debt. According to the majority, this valuable right was
"an interest in property" within Regulation Z's definition of security
interest." As stated by the court, "[i]f the security interest was im-
portant enough for defendant to acquire, it was important enough to
disclose."' 5 Citing the desirability of uniform interpretation of the
Truth in Lending disclosure requirements,"6 the Fifth Circuit re-
ferred to Gennuso and found liability for failure to disclose a security
interest.'7
However, not every case involving the assignment of proceeds
and unearned premiums has reached this result. Only a week after
Edmondson was decided, a contrary result was reached in Rounds v.
Community National Bank in Monmouth," a case involving parallel
facts. Without mentioning Gennuso or Edmondson, the court in
Rounds persuasively argued that no security interest is created.
Drawing heavily upon the rationale of Mims v. Dixie Finance
Corp.,'9 involving waiver of homestead exemption, the opinion traced
several steps involved in the determination of whether a security in-
terest has been created:
The first is that the character of a right which is claimed to
create a security interest must be adjudged and determined by
the application of state law. The second is that TILA [Truth in
Lending Act] disclosures as to security interests must be so
limited as to avoid the obscuration of required disclosures by
balance of the loan. If the borrower is not in default, the creditor may apply returned
premiums toward substitute insurance on the property.
43. 577 F.2d at 294. The Edmondson court quoted extensively from Elzea v. Na-
tional Bank of Georgia, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978), emphasizing that attention should
focus on whether a debtor has given up a valuable privilege as security for his debt.
44. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) provides in pertinent part: "'security interest' and
'security' means any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." (emphasis added).
45. 577 F.2d at 294. Actually, the Edmondson court was quoting a statement made
by the special master who presided over the trial of this complex case.
46. This desire was expressed previously by the Fifth Circuit in McDaniel v.
Fulton Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 571 F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1978).
47. 577 F.2d at 294-95.
48. 454 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
49. 426 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (waiver of homestead exemption is not a
security interest within Regulation Z § 226.8(b)(5)).
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the inclusion of the unnecessary and irrelevant description of
other contract clauses and rights which do not create a security
interest in the legal sense. The third is that the term "security
interest," as employed in TILA and the Regulation [Z], must be
limited by its definition to those contractual or statutory rights
which create a lien upon the debtor's property.'
The court in Rounds, in contrast to Edmondson, avoided a strict
interpretation of Regulation Z and instead used a practical approach
to find that not every interest or benefit in favor of a creditor is a
security interest within the intent of the Truth in Lending Act.
While conceding that assignments of proceeds and unearned'
premiums provide some benefit to the creditor, the Rounds court
determined that such assignments amount to an even greater
benefit for the debtor. 1 Under the terms of the contract involved,
risk of loss of the automobile was on the debtor. In the event of loss,
the debtor would have been bound to discharge the obligation.
However, by applying the proceeds of the insurance to the debt, the
debtor's obligation would have been extinguished or reduced. In
other words, the right was designed to ensure that the debtor would
not be left with a significant obligation if he suffered an accidental
loss of his property. Such contractual provisions could not create N
security interests within the intent of the Truth in Lending Act. In
the words of the Rounds court: "If such ephemeral interests are to
be deemed to be security interests within the disclosure require-
ments of the Act, that determination should emanate from Congres-
sional enactment or from a determination of the Board, not from
judicial decree."52
Perhaps the most interesting security interest case involving a
loss payable clause is Souife v. First National Bank of Commerce." The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant bank failed to disclose a security
interest in property insurance proceeds and in unearned property
insurance premiums, as well as in the proceeds of voluntary credit
life insurance and in any returned premiums thereunder. The de-
fendant bank argued that the determination of what constitutes a
50. 454 F. Supp. at 887 (citation omitted). The Rounds court believed that a security
interest within the contemplation of Regulation Z is limited to provisions that have the
effect of imposing a lien upon or a charge against the property of the debtor. Hence,
the court perceived the issue of this case to be "whether the definition of 'security in-
terest' should be expanded . . .to include the rights to apply unearned premiums,
which the lender advanced as a part of the loan, and to apply the proceeds obtained by
any insured loss to payment of the loan." Id. at 887-88 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 888.
52. Id.
53. 452 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. La. 1978).
19801
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security interest involves interpreting state law 4 and that the
assignment of proceeds and unearned premiums is not a security in-
terest under the applicable Louisiana law. 5 Unfortunately, the
district court skirted this important question, holding that if indeed
the assignment was a security interest, it was adequately disclosed.
In so doing, however, the court took a significant step away from
the typically strict enforcement of Regulation Z requirements, find-
ing that disclosure of the assignment of proceeds and of unearned
premiums was even more meaningful when disclosed under the
heading "Insurance" rather than under "Security Interests."6
State Law and Opinion Letter No. 1263
Certainly, courts such as those in Rounds and Souife, which take
a common sense approach to alleged Truth in Lending violations,
are the exception and not the rule. All too often courts simply look
to the introductory phrase in the Regulation Z definition of security
interest which states that it is "any interest in property which
secures payment or performance of an obligation."57 Illustrating this
point is the recent decision in Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, Inc.,8 in-
volving the consolidation of ten security interest cases alleging
failure to disclose interests in unearned or rebated premiums of
property insurance policies. Citing Federal Reserve Board Staff Opin-
ion Letter No. 1263"9 for the proposition that state law determines
54. In so arguing the defendant bank relied upon Staff Opinion Letter No. 1263,
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,750 (Nov. 23, 1977), which arguably determines that
state law controls in determining what constitutes a security interest. See text at
notes 57-89, infra.
55. 452 F. Supp. 820 n.4.
56. Id. at 821. Apparently, the defendant bank had separated its disclosure state-
ment into paragraphs, each paragraph making a required disclosure and designated by
a letter of the alphabet and by the type of disclosure made. Under the paragraph labeled
"D. SECURITY INTEREST," the creditor clearly disclosed the type of security in-
terest as a "Louisiana Chattel Mortgage." Id. Immediately following is a paragraph
designated as "E. INSURANCE" in which unearned premiums are assigned. Id.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1980).
58. 480 F. Supp. 491 (D. N.M. 1979).
59. CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,736 (Nov. 23, 1977). Opinion Letter No. 1263
provides, in pertinent part:
What constitutes adequate identification of the type of security interest ac-
quired by the creditor depends upon how relevant State law would describe the
security interest. Note that a more fundamental matter in these circumstances
may be to determine whether a security interest exists at all and, if so, to identify
the property subject to such interest. Section 226.2(gg) [of Regulation Z] defines
"security interest" as "any interest in property which secures payment or perfor-
mance of an obligation." Thus, if the creditor does not acquire any interest in
property (including real property and tangible or intangible personal property), or
COMMENTS
whether an interest in property is created, Hernandez holds that if
such an interest is created under state law, a disclosure is required,
since a security interest under Regulation Z is any interest in prop-
erty. The approach is simplistic: if any interest is created under
state law, it is a security interest for the purposes of Regulation Z.
Perhaps the solution to the security interest dilemma is not this
simple. The definition of "security interest" found in Regulation Z is
not as broad as courts such as Hernandez and Edmondson have in-
dicated. The Regulation Z definition modifies the "any interest in
property" language to illustrate the kinds of security interests con-
templated by the Board of Governors. Among the enumerated in-
terests are mortgages, deeds of trust, mechanic's and materialmen's
liens, and any lien on property arising by operation of law. The ex-
amples of contemplated security interests involve liens or privileges
on the debtor's property in favor of the creditor that are superior to
the rights of third persons.1 Indeed, if a creditor were to be asked
what constitutes a security interest under Regulation Z, an almost
automatic response probably would be that a security interest is any
interest which gives the creditor a preference over the rights of
third persons in the debtor's property. Such interests typically re-
quire special forms and registry in the public records. It becomes in-
creasingly apparent that the same creditor would probably not even
consider the need for making a security interest disclosure when
if any such interest does not secure payment of the debt, no security interest ex-
ists. For example, the contractual right to proceed under an insurance policy may
not amount to an interest in property. On the other hand, assignment of returned
and unearned premiums may transfer to the creditors such an interest. However,
staff believes these questions would be better addressed as a matter of State law.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1980) defines a security interest subject to disclosure as:
any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
The terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform
Commercial Code, real property mortgages, deeds of trust, and other consensual
or confessed liens whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's,
and other similar liens, vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the in-
terest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any lien on property
arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to secure pay-
ment or performance of an obligation.
61. Although the enumerated examples of security interests given by the drafters
of Regulation Z appear directed at those interests that give the creditor a preference
over the rights of third persons, the majority of security interest cases have not con-
sidered the issue. Only two cases have discussed the requirement of lien or preference.
See Rounds v. Community Nat'l Bank, 454 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Mims v.
Dixie Fin. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 627, 637 (N.D. Ga. 1976). In both instances, the courts
found that the question of whether a lien or privilege creating a security interest is
found in a transaction is one to be determined by state law.
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there is an assignment of insurance proceeds or unearned
premiums. 2
As Hernandez points out, Opinion Letter No. 1263 explicitly
states that state law is determinative of whether a security interest
has been created."' The creditor in Souife seized upon this inter-
pretation to argue that under Louisiana law, no security interest
had been created." Under Louisiana's unique civil law concept of
security interests, an interest in property in favor of a creditor is ef-
fective against the debtor, as well as third persons, only if the in-
terest is a mortage, pledge, privilege, or other security device
under Louisiana law. 5 Although the court never reached the issue,
apparently state law should be the determining factor in these
cases. However, Hernandez appears to dismiss both Opinion Letter
No. 1263 and any serious study of state law considerations by find-
ing that any substantive interest in property is a security interest
requiring disclosure." Although Hernandez declares that state law
determines the substance of the interest created, the effect of this
holding is to find a security interest requiring disclosure any time
any interest is created that is not illegal under state law, regardless
of whether the interest grants the creditor a preference over third
parties or of whether state law actually defines the interest. 7 Cer-
tainly, these are not the types of security interests contemplated
when the Regulation Z section 226.2(gg) illustrations of privileges
and liens were adopted. 8 Just as the creditor viewed a security in-
terest as involving specialized forms and recordation, so did the ex-
amples given in the security interest definition. Surely the drafters
of Truth in Lending and Regulation Z did not intend that their
62. The court in Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 557 F.2d 291, 294-95 (5th
Cir. 1978), recognized the frequency with which such assignments occur and the failure
of creditors to recognize these as security interests. However, the court believed quite
strongly that a valuable interest in property requiring disclosure had been created,
regardless of whether this interest gave the creditor a preference in the debtor's prop-
erty superior to the right of third persons.
63. See note 60, supra.
64. 452 F. Supp. at 820 n.4.
65. See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3133-3411. This is not the first time a
creditor has argued that an interest that would be a security device requiring
disclosure under the laws of other states would not require disclosure under Louisiana
law. In Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 (1976), the creditor suc-
cessfully argued that a confession of judgment clause-a security interest in most com-
mon law jurisdictions-is merely a procedural device under Louisiana law, giving the
creditor no additional substantive rights. See Staff Opinion Letter No. 759, CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,081 (Feb. 28, 1974).
66. 480 F. Supp. at 495.
67. Id.
68. See text at note 60, supra.
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somewhat limited definition of security interest should be expanded
to cover the widest possible interests not invalidated by state law.
It is evident that Truth in Lending cases pose serious problems
for the courts because of the enormous number of regulations, inter-
pretations, opinion letters, and conflicting jurisprudence. The rights
created by the assignment of insurance proceeds and by the assign-
ment of unearned premiums have been combined here for the sake
of convenience; but few courts have managed to draw a distinction
between these entirely separate rights. 9 For example, it can be
argued persuasively that many of the loss payee cases could have
been avoided, since an assignment of proceeds clause should not
create an interest in property until an accident or event arises
which causes a payment of proceeds. Indeed, Regulation Z section
226.6(g) provides that a creditor will not be liable under the Act if
the information disclosed is rendered inaccurate because a subse-
quent occurrence (e.g., an accident for which payment will be forth-
coming under the insurance policy) creates a security interest." If a
Truth in Lending claim is brought on an existing loan and no acci-
dent has occurred requiring that insurance proceeds be paid to the
creditor, the case is premature; there is not yet any property in
which the creditor may have a security interest. A similar argument
can be made for the separate right to any return of insurance
premiums. Absent an early cancellation of the insurance policy,
there is no property (rebated premiums) within the contemplation of
the security interest provisions of Regulation Z. Hence, it appears
that despite the frequent failure of courts to recognize that only
preferences superior to the rights of third persons should be classi-
fied as security interests requiring disclosures, courts could avoid
considerable litigation by examining general disclosure require-
69. The Federal Reserve Board staff recognized the basic distinction in the rights
and remedies of these two interests in Opinion Letter No. 1263, note 59 supra, when it
stated:
Note that a more fundamental matter in these circumstances may be to determine
whether a security interest exists at all and, if so, to identify the property subject
to such interest. . . . For example, the contractual right to proceed under an in-
surance policy may not amount to an interest in property. On the other hand,
assignment of returned and unearned premiums may transfer to the creditors
such an interest.
Staff Opinion Letter No. 1263, CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,736 (Nov. 23, 1977).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(g) (1980) provides:
Effect of subsequent occurrence. If information disclosed in accordance with
this Part is subsequently rendered inaccurate as the result of any act, occurrence,
or agreement subsequent to the delivery of the required disclosures, the inac-
curacy resulting therefrom does not constitute a violation of this Part.
(Footnote omitted.)
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ments such as section 226.6(g) in addition to the security interest
provisions."
Truth in Lending Simplification
The Truth in Lending Act has a laudable purpose: to provide
consumers with information sufficient to enable them to make in-
formed decisions about credit. Unfortunately, enforcement of the
Act is problematical, and abuse of its remedies by plaintiffs under-
mines its purpose." Often a consumer who has defaulted on his loan
will seek legal aid to avoid impending seizure and garnishment pro-
ceedings. Rather than attempting to build a defense, the consumer
is encouraged to take the offensive by bringing a Truth in Lending
claim against the creditor."3
Potential and actual abuse of the Act has not gone entirely un-
noticed by the courts. Noting that many Truth in Lending claims are
brought by plaintiffs who are not misled or misinformed by
disclosure statements,7" one court stated:
These plaintiffs have merely sought a windfall penalty from a
lender by picking apart its loan form word by word in search of
a technical deviation from the language of the statutes and
regulations. The Truth in Lending Act was never meant to make
the district courts forums for word games between lenders and
borrowers in which a borrower's attorney who is adept at using
legalese and arguing technicalities is awarded a prize for himself
and his client."
Whether Truth in Lending is achieving its objectives is ques-
tionable. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
71. 12 C.F.R. § 2 2 6.6(g), 226.8(b)(5) (1980).
72. This writer is not the first to direct criticism at the Truth in Lending Act. See
Edmonds & Taylor, Truth and Consequences, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367 (1978) in
which it is said that Truth in Lending serves mostly as "a trap for the unwary
creditor." Id. at 391.
73. As one authority has stated, "[flew clients come to a lawyer's office with an in-
kling that they have a TIL [Truth in Lending] claim. To recognize a potential TIL
claim a consumer would have to know the intricate provisions of the statute and
Regulation Z and ... that the TIL statement did not comply." Landers, supra note 21,
at 677.
74. To bring successfully a claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act, a
plaintiff need not prove that he was misled by the disclosures. He must show only that
the disclosures were such that someone could have been misled. The Act apparently
views plaintiffs who have not been misled as useful in enforcing the Act.
75. Sanders v. Auto Associates, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D. S.C. 1978). Cf.
Wilson v. Allied Loans, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D. S.C. 1978). where the court
said: "This barratrous legislation transforms loan documents into contest puzzles in
which prizes are awarded to those who can uncover the technical defects."
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the body responsible for implementing Regulation Z, noted in its an-
nual report to Congress for the year 1978 that a survey indicated
that nearly two-thirds of consumers believed that Truth in Lending
statements are not read and almost three-fourths agreed that the
disclosure statements are too complicated." Apparently, the like-
lihood of severe penalties for technical violations17 has encouraged
creditors to include every bit of information that might possibly re-
quire disclosure. Instead of receiving a simplified disclosure of the
annual percentage rate and finance charge on his loan, the consumer
often finds himself holding a two-foot-long disclosure statement
crammed with information that he does not understand and about
which he has no desire to learn.
In 1976 Congress realized that disclosure requirements had
become so complicated that it was unreasonable to expect con-
sumers to read or understand the disclosure.7 1 Instead of encourag-
ing competitive shopping for better credit terms, the Act has reduced
competition by driving small creditors out of the market." More-
over, despite the sustained efforts of creditors to achieve compliance
with the Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation cited 507
banks in a six-month period in 1976 for failure to comply with the
very basic disclosures of annual percentage rates and finance
charges."0
Congressional awareness of these problems with Truth in Lend-
ing has led to the introduction of at least one bill each year pro-
posing simplification and reform of the Act.8 ' One of the major pro-
ponents of Truth in Lending reform is Senator William Proxmire, an
original supporter of Truth in Lending when it was enacted in
76. Federal Reserve Board Recommendations to Congress, Truth in Lending An-
nual Report To Congress for the Year 1978 by the Board of Govenors of the Federal
Reserve System, CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 4 (January 25, 1979).
77. For example, in one consolidated case, two creditors were held liable for
failure to disclose license and title fees as required by Regulation Z section 226.4(b)(4).
One creditor was liable for $577.84 plus attorney's fees for failing to disclose a $4.00
fee while the other was obligated to pay $2,000 plus attorney's fees for failure to
itemize $17.75 in fees. Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. N.C.
1979).
78. See generally Oversight On Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Bank-
ing Agencies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1976).
79. Id. at 162.
80. S. REP. No. 94-1388, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6. As one author states, if this is the
compliance rate for bankers, one can only wonder what it must be for less scrupulous
merchants. Note, Truth In Lending-A Time For Reform, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 575
(1977).
81. See S. 108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1846, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S.
3875, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
19801
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
1968.2 On March 31, 1980, the most recent simplification proposal"3
was enacted as the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act84 and will be fully effective April 1, 1982. The purpose of the
reform legislation is to streamline the twelve-year-old Truth in
Lending Act, limiting civil liability to those disclosures that are of
central importance in clarifying a credit transaction's costs or terms,
thereby eliminating litigation for purely technical violations.85
Significantly, section 615(b) of Truth in Lending Simplification
amends the security interest provisions of the Truth in Lending Act
to require only disclosure of whether the transaction is secured,
whether a security interest is taken in property purchased under
the transaction, and whether a security interest is taken in other
(non-purchased) property, identified by time or type. Requirements
that the collateral be identified and that disclosure be made of any
security interest affecting after-acquired property or future indebt-
edness are eliminated. Presumably, much of the litigation involving
technical disclosures of security interests will be obviated by the
reform legislation. It will be remembered that Rounds"8 stated that
any rights of the creditor to insurance proceeds and unearned pre-
miums serve to benefit the consumer as well as the creditor and
therefore are not the kinds of interest required to be disclosed
within the original intent of the Truth in Lending Act. Evidently,
the new Act adopts a practical approach similar to that of Rounds
and requires only disclosure of information central to making in-
formed credit decisions.
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the Truth in Lending Act and, in
particular, disclosure of security interests have benefitted the con-
82. See note 8, supra.
83. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 2271 (1980).
84. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act comprises title VI of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Pub. L.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
85. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. 96-221, § 615(b),
amending 15 U.S.C. 1640(a) (1976). A Senate Committee Report clearly expresses the
intent to eliminate liability for inconsequential violations:
This section [615(b)] is intended to restrict the scope of creditor liability for
statutory penalties to only those disclosures which are of material importance in
credit shopping. The committee believes this will eliminate litigation based.on
purely technical violations of the Act.
S. REP. No. 96-73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 878, 883. The substance of the text of S. 108 was inserted into H.R. 4986, subse-
quently enacted as Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).




sumer. The greater standardization of the terminology of credit
transactions and the development of such uniform concepts as annual
percentage rate and finance charge help protect consumers from
questionable credit practices. However, the lack of harmony in
security interest cases such as Edmondson and Rounds, the incen-
tives to litigate provided to consumers, 7 and the resulting disincen-
tives to creditors88 make the Truth in Lending Act a catalyst for
litigation and often force creditors into settlements disproportionate
to the harm caused. Moreover, the disclosure requirements of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z have become so complex
that disclosure statements are virtually useless to anyone but the
student of semantics. The Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act should serve to streamline disclosure forms and to
eliminate unnecessary disclosures that actually obscure critical
transaction information while still promoting the achievement of
Truth in Lending goals by tying claims under the Act to actual harm
caused the consumer by a violation. Until the Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act becomes effective in 1982, it is hoped
courts will use the reform legislation as a guide to the original in-
tent of Truth in Lending and not delay for two years the elimination
of civil liability for mere technical violations of the Act.
Paul David
87. See notes 11-15, supra and accompanying text.
88. Estimates indicate that consumers have a very good success record in the
cases that are decided on the merits. See Landers, supra note 21.
89. Creditors often find it more advantageous to settle a weak claim than to incur
the defense costs that could far exceed the amount of statutory damages. See note 13,
supra.
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